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INTRODUCTION
In February 1997, in the face of pervasive and worsening problems in the
administration of the death penalty, the American Bar Association (ABA) House
of Delegates passed a resolution calling for a general moratorium on executions
until flaws in the system are eliminated. The resolution was supported by a report
outlining serious deficiencies in five areas: the competency of State-appointed
counsel in capital cases, the independence and thoroughness of post-conviction
and habeas corpus review of capital cases, continuing racial discrimination in the
exercise of discretion in capital cases, and imposition of the death penalty on the
mentally retarded and on individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the
time they committed capital offenses.
The ABA's action reflected a belief that this country's capital punishment
system is so fundamentally flawed that it not only is tragically and irreparably
harming defendants in many cases, but also is undermining public confidence in
the fairness of the legal system as a whole. Since 1997, the timeliness of the
ABA's call for a moratorium has been demonstrated in dramatic fashion.
Early last year, after the number of innocent people that the State of Illinois
had released from its death row had surpassed the number of people that the State
had executed, the governor of Illinois imposed a moratorium on executions in that
state. But Illinois is not the only state that has experienced miscarriages of justice
in the capital punishment system nationwide. Late last year, for example, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation produced evidence that exonerated an individual
who earlier had died on Florida's death row after languishing there for fourteen
years. Nationwide, since 1972, almost 100 individuals originally sentenced to
death have been exonerated.
States also have sentenced numerous individuals to death unfairly or
improperly. A recent study by scholars at Columbia University School of Law
reported that, in reviews of capital cases between 1973 and 1995, courts
overturned more than two-thirds of death sentences because of serious state or
federal constitutional violations in the processes that led to the capital sentences.
In virtually all of these cases, one or more of the systemic flaws that underlie the
ABA's call for a moratorium was a factor in the reversal.
As such disturbing facts have become more widely known, a number of
states besides Illinois have begun to consider moratoriums or other actions to
address problems in death penalty processes. In 1999, prior to the Illinois
governor's moratorium declaration, the Nebraska legislature voted to impose a
moratorium in that state. Although the governor vetoed the bill, the legislature
authorized a comprehensive two-year study of the state's administration of the
death penalty. Other states are considering proposed legislation that would
impose moratoriums while similar comprehensive studies are conducted or have
initiated studies without first imposing moratoriums.
In view of such developments and the growing interest of public officials and
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the public generally in examining the fairness of the death penalty, the ABA
Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities has developed these protocols to
assist those undertaking reviews of death penalty laws and processes in individual
states, as well as those interested in monitoring such reviews.
The protocols are divided into two parts. The first part focuses on an
examination of the actors in and stages of the death penalty process and ways in
which those actors may contribute to flaws that can lead to arbitrary and unfair
imposition of capital punishment and, in some cases, to the wrongful conviction
of innocent people. The second part focuses on vulnerable populations-
offenders convicted of killing white people, members of racial minorities,
juveniles, the mentally retarded, and the mentally ill-and encourages
examination of the treatment of these individuals by the capital punishment
system.
The protocols address eight specific areas of concern: defense services,
procedural restrictions, clemency, jury instruction, judicial independence, racial
discrimination, and the sentencing of juveniles and mentally retarded or mentally
ill defendants in capital cases. Each protocol contains a brief introductory
overview of the issues involved in the subject area, a list of questions to be
considered in a comprehensive review, and a list of recommendations for
improving administration of the system in the particular area. Both the subjects
covered and the guidance offered are based largely upon principles and policies
that underlie the ABA moratorium resolution.
These protocols are not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, their purpose is to
direct attention to areas that experience has shown contribute to errors in
administration of the death penalty. There may be areas not identified in these
protocols that may require examination in some jurisdictions; similarly, issues
raised in these protocols are not equally problematic in all capital jurisdictions.
Each jurisdiction that authorizes the death penalty therefore must tailor a review
of its system to take into account issues that may be unique to that jurisdiction.
Each capital jurisdiction is urged to use these protocols as a floor, not a ceiling, to
develop a review framework that ensures that all relevant factors are taken into
full consideration.
In undertaking the review contemplated by these protocols, the question is
not whether, as a matter of morality, philosophy, or penologic theory, there
should be a death penalty. In fact, the ABA itself has taken no position on that
issue, beyond opposing imposition of the death penalty in cases involving
mentally retarded individuals or individuals who were under age eighteen at the
time they committed capital offenses. But each jurisdiction that imposes the death
penalty has a duty to determine whether the system under which the penalty is
imposed and carried out is flawed and, if so, to eliminate the flaws. These
protocols are intended to help capital jurisdictions meet this fundamental
obligation systematically and comprehensively.
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PART ONE: THE DEATH PENALTY ADMINISTRATION PROCESS
I. DEFENSE SERVICES
A. Overview
A primary reason for the American Bar Association's 1997 call for a
moratorium on executions was the urgent concern that many individuals charged
with capital offenses are not provided with adequate counsel at one or more levels
of the capital punishment process. By 1997, it had become apparent that the
quality of counsel, more than the circumstances of the offense and the record and
history of the offender, frequently determines who receives a death sentence. The
failure to appoint lawyers competent to represent capital defendants and death
row inmates is one of the major causes of serious errors in capital cases, as well as
a major factor in the wrongful conviction and sentencing to death of innocent
people.
Last year, a team of researchers from Columbia University released results of
a study that underscores the ABA's concern about the role of inadequate counsel
in contributing to serious flaws in administration of the death penalty.' This study
found that, between 1973 and 1995, state and federal courts undertaking reviews
of capital cases identified sufficiently serious errors to require retrials or
resentencing in 68% of the cases reviewed. Prominent among the causes of such
errors was incompetent defense counsel. (The actual extent of this problem is
likely even greater than the Columbia University study reveals; in numerous
cases, counsel had been appointed whose performance, although clearly
inadequate, was not sufficiently egregious to warrant relief under the very high
legal standard for establishing "ineffective assistance of counsel" violative of
constitutional rights. Moreover, incompetent counsel in post-conviction
proceedings is not a basis for relief.)
Other recent reports also have identified inadequate counsel as a factor in a
startlingly large number of cases in which individuals convicted and sentenced to
death subsequently have been found to be innocent.
It is clear that capital jurisdictions likely would reduce some of the serious
errors that occur in capital cases by providing competent counsel to represent
individuals facing the death penalty and by providing such counsel with sufficient
compensation and resources for investigative services and experts, as well as
sufficient time to prepare cases effectively. Although lawyers and the organized
bar can provide valuable assistance through pro bono services, state governments
have primary responsibility-indeed, a constitutional duty-to ensure adequate
representation at every level in capital cases through appropriate appointment and
2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-
1995 (2000).
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compensation measures. Determining how best to discharge that obligation
requires an objective and comprehensive assessment of the cunent system and
identification of specific inadequacies and the means to eliminate them.
B. Guidelinesfor Review of Defense Services
1. How adequate are the defense services available pretrial and at trial in
capital cases?
a. Who appoints counsel?
b. What are the standards for appointment?
i. What are the minimum qualifications for appointment as lead
- counsel and as secondary counsel?
ii. Do these standards take into account the unique complexity of
capital cases, which involve two related, but quite independent,
phases; special jury selection methods; and knowledge of special
constitutional doctrines?
iii. Do sufficient numbers of lawyers in the appointing jurisdiction
meet the standards for appointment?
iv. Do the standards require consideration of the overall workload
and state of health of appointed counsel to avoid appointment of
lawyers who otherwise might be competent to serve, but who
cannot provide effective assistance in the case at hand because
of workloads or health?
v. Is compliance with the standards monitored and enforced? If so,
how?
c. How adequate is the compensation for appointed lawyers in capital
cases?
i. How is the rate established and by whom?
ii. How is the rate adjusted, how often, according to what criteria,
and by whom?
iii. When in the process are counsel compensated?
2002]
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iv. Is the actual practice of compensating counsel consistent with
the jurisdiction's stated policy on compensation?
d. What other defense services are provided for capital defendants?
i. Are investigators, experts, and other defense services, including
those noted below, provided for by statute, rule, or practice?
(a) Investigators, including mitigation specialists
(b) Trial and consulting experts
(c) Mental health evaluations
(d) Scientific testing
ii. What are the procedures for obtaining such services in:
(a) Adversarial proceedings?
(b) Ex parte proceedings?
iii. Are limits placed on the availability of such services?
(a) Are some services generally not available?
(b) Do statutes, rules, or practices limit the amount that the
jurisdiction will pay for certain services?
e. Are defense counsel given adequate pretrial discovery of material
available to prosecutors and law enforcement officials that may bear
on guilt, innocence, and punishment of the defendant?
f, Are proceedings in capital cases scheduled at a pace that permits
adequate investigation, fact development, and decision making by
defense counsel?
g. Where the costs of capital cases are borne by local or county govern-
ments, do state resources supplement local resources, as necessary,
to ensure quality defense services in localities that lack or fail to
provide the necessary funding?
2. How adequate are the defense services available on direct appeal of
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capital cases, including review in the U.S. Supreme Court?
a. Who appoints appellate counsel?
b. What are the standards for appointment of appellate counsel?
i. What are the minimum qualifications for appointment?
ii. Do these standards take into account the unique complexity of
appeals in capital cases?
iii. Do sufficient numbers of lawyers in the appointing jurisdiction
meet the standards for appointment?
iv. Do the standards require consideration of the overall workload
and state of health of counsel to avoid appointment of lawyers
who otherwise might be competent to serve, but who cannot
provide effective assistance in the case at hand because of
workloads or health?
v. Is compliance with the standards monitored and enforced? If so,
how?
c. Does the jurisdiction appoint appellate counsel who are authorized to
seek certiorari for a death row inmate? If not, is there some other
mechanism whereby such counsel are provided?
d. Is there an automatic stay of execution during the time permitted for
seeking certiorari and during the pendency of a petition for
certiorari?
e. How adequate is the compensation for appointed attorneys handling
direct appeals and/or certiorari petitions?
i. How is the rate established and by whom?
ii. How is the rate adjusted, how often, according to what criteria,
and by whom?
iii. When in the process are counsel compensated?
iv. Is the actual practice of compensating counsel consistent with
the jurisdiction's stated policy on compensation?
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f. What other defense services are provided for capital defendants on
direct appeal?
i. In cases where such services could be useful, are other defense
services, including those noted below, provided for by statute,
rule, or practice?
(a) Investigators, including mitigation specialists
(b) Consulting experts
(c) Mental health evaluations
(d) Scientific testing
ii. What are the procedures for obtaining such services in:
(a) Adversarial proceedings?
(b) Ex parte proceedings?
iii. Are limits placed on the availability of such services?
(a) Are some services generally not available?
(b) Do statutes, rules, or practices limit the amount that the
jurisdiction will pay for certain services?
g. Are proceedings scheduled at a pace that permits adequate
investigation, fact development, and decision making by counsel?
3. How adequate are the defense services available to death row inmates in
state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings in capital
cases?
a. Is counsel provided? If so, who appoints counsel or how else is
counsel secured?
b. What are the standards for appointment or other selection of counsel
for post-conviction or habeas corpus proceedings?
i. What are the minimum qualifications for appointment or
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selection as counsel?
ii. Do the standards take into account the unique complexity of
collateral proceedings in capital cases?
iii. Do sufficient numbers of lawyers in the jurisdiction meet the
standard for appointment or selection?
iv. Do the standards require consideration of the overall workload
and state of health of counsel to avoid appointment or selection
of lawyers who otherwise might be competent to serve, but who
cannot provide effective assistance in the case at hand because
of workload or health?
v. Is compliance with the standards monitored and enforced? If so,
how?
c. How adequate is the compensation for appointed lawyers in
collateral proceedings?
i. How is the rate established and by whom?
ii. How is the rate adjusted, how often, according to what criteria,
and by whom?
iii. When in the process are counsel compensated?
iv. Is the actual practice of compensating counsel consistent with
the jurisdiction's stated policy on compensation?
d. What other services are provided to death row inmates in connection
with state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings?
i. Are investigators, experts, and other services, included those
listed below, available by statute, rule, or practice?
(a) Investigators, including mitigation specialists
(b) Experts
(c) Mental health evaluations
(d) Scientific testing
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ii. What are the procedures for obtaining such services in:
(a) Adversarial proceedings?
(b) Ex parte proceedings?
iii. Are limits placed on the availability of such services?
(a) Are some services generally not available?
(b) Do statutes, rules, or practices limit the amount that the
jurisdiction will pay for certain services?
e. Are post-conviction and habeas corpus proceedings in capital cases
scheduled at a pace that permits adequate investigation, fact develop-
ment, and decision-making by counsel for death row inmates?
i. If there is a time limit for the preparation of a post-conviction
petition, is that time limit tolled during the time it takes to find
appropriate counsel?
ii. How long does it take to find appropriate counsel?
f Is there an automatic stay of execution during the pendency of post-
conviction and habeas corpus proceedings?
4. How adequate are the services available to death row inmates in
clemency proceedings?
a. Is counsel provided? If so, who appoints counsel or how else is
counsel secured?
b. What are the standards for appointment or other selection of counsel
for clemency proceedings?
i. What are the minimum qualifications for selection as counsel?
ii. Is compliance with the standards monitored and enforced? If so,
how?
c. How adequate is the compensation for lawyers appointed in
clemency proceedings?
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i. How is the rate established and by whom?
ii. How is the rate adjusted, how often, according to what criteria,
and by whom?
iii. When in the process are counsel compensated?
iv. Is the actual practice of compensating counsel consistent with
the jurisdiction's stated policy on compensation?
d. What other services are provided to death row inmates in connection
with clemency proceedings?
i. What are the procedures for obtaining such services?
ii. Are limits placed on the availability of such services?
(a) Are some services generally not availableT
(b) Do statutes, rules, or practices place limits on the amount
that the jurisdiction will pay for certain services?
e. Are clemency proceedings in capital cases scheduled at a pace that
permits adequate investigation, fact development, and decision-
making by counsel for death row inmates?
5. How does the level and quality of services provided for individuals
facing the death penalty compare to the services available to the
prosecutors in capital cases?
a. What are the minimum standards for prosecutors assigned to capital
cases?
b. What resources are actually available to prosecutors in capital cases?
6. What has been the actual quality of counsel in pretrial (including plea-
bargaining), trial, direct appeal, certiorari, state post-conviction, federal
habeas corpus, and clemency proceedings in cases in which the death
penalty has been imposed in the jurisdiction?
7. Is there a specifically funded, independent, statewide system for
providing adequate legal services to individuals facing capital
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punishment in the jurisdiction?
a. If not, what level of resources is required to establish such a system?
b. What are the near- or long-term prospects for establishing such a
system?
C. Recommendations for Establishing Adequate Defense Services
1. An individual facing the death penalty in any capital jurisdiction should
have qualified and properly compensated counsel at every stage of the
legal proceedings-pretrial (including plea-bargaining), trial, direct
appeal, all certiorari petitions, state post-conviction and federal habeas
corpus proceedings, and clemency-who are appointed as quickly as
possible prior to any proceedings. At minimum, satisfying this standard
requires the following:
a. At least two lawyers at every stage of proceedings;
b. Lawyers who are trained properly in death penalty law and
procedure, as well as in general criminal law and procedure; at least
one of these lawyers should have a minimum number of years of
practice in felony trial work (this minimum requirement is not
intended to preclude the participation of others on the counsel team
who do not have this level of expertise in capital representation, but
who can provide other types of expertise for the defense team); and
c. Lawyers with expertise in jury selection, plea bargaining, and
investigation and preparation for guilt/innocence and penalty phases
of capital trials.
2. The selection and evaluation process should include:
a. A statewide appointing authority, not comprised of judges,
consistent with the types of statewide appointing authority proposed
by the ABA3 such as:
i. A statewide defender organization;
ii. A capital litigation resource center; or
3 See AMERiCAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEATH PENALTY
HABEAS CoRpus, 2-3, app. B thereto, proposed § 2254(h)(1), (2)(1, reprinted in 40 AM. U.
L. REv. 1,9,12,254 (1990).
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iii. A special committee selected by the state court of last resort, in
consultation with staff lawyers of a defender organization,
members of the private bar, or both; committee members
should, inter alia, have practiced criminal defense for at least
five years, have demonstrated knowledge of capital case
practice, and be familiar with the state's criminal practitioners;
b. Development and maintenance, by the statewide appointing
authority, of a roster of eligible lawyers for each phase of
representation;
c. A process that ensures that lawyers are eligible, qualified, and
trained to represent death penalty clients in each phase of
representation; and
d. Monitoring of capital counsel performance and workload to ensure
quality representation in accordance with performance and workload
standards, with the recognition that proper compensation alone does
not guarantee effective performance.
3. Compensation for lawyers appointed in capital cases should be paid from
a state or local fund according to a reasonable rate of hourly
compensation commensurate with the provision of effective assistance in
complex cases.
a. Compensation must include full reimbursement for reasonable
incidental expenses.
b. The system must allow for periodic billing and payment during the
course of representation.
c. Compensation should be evaluated according to the following
criteria:
i. A recognized group that has assessed defense services funding
in numerous states should be retained to evaluate the funding of
counsel and support for counsel at all stages of proceedings; and
ii. Any evaluation should include a survey of lawyers who actually
have handled capital cases-including public defenders,
appointed counsel, pro bono lawyers, and retained counsel-to
determine how many hours, and what resources, have been
2002]
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required to handle these cases properly at each phase of the
proceedings.
4. At all phases of death penalty proceedings, qualified, .properly
compensated support, including investigators, experts, mitigation special-
ists, and other specialists as needed, must be provided, through ex parte
proceedings, to counsel appointed to represent the individual facing the
death penalty.
a. Courts should appoint mental health and other experts who report
confidentially to counsel for the individual facing the death penalty.
Such experts should be selected on the basis of their independence,
qualifications, professionalism, and suitability for the services
requested, not on the basis of cost of services, prior work for the
prosecution, or professional status with the state.
b. Courts should eliminate procedural requirements for obtaining these
services that have the effect of discouraging counsel for the
individual facing the death penalty from seeking services that are
theoretically available, including, e.g., requirements for defense
counsel's advance payments for experts without knowing whether or
how much of the money will be reimbursed; onerous or impractical
documentation of facts to support requests for funds; and lack of a
genuine ex parte procedure for requesting defense funds.
5. For post-conviction proceedings, federal habeas corpus, and clemency
proceedings in capital cases, all of which involve specialized expertise
that ordinarily is not available in small communities or is available
unevenly throughout a state, the state should:
a. Appoint counsel to handle these proceedings expeditiously,
particularly ensuring that post-conviction counsel are appointed
during the time that certiorari from direct appeal may be sought and
that any state statutes of limitations are tolled during the time it takes
to secure such qualified counsel;
b. In the absence of federal funding, provide and fund a state center to
provide lawyers to handle such proceedings and to locate, train, and
mentor lawyers to handle proceedings that the state center cannot
itself handle; and
c. Urge the U.S. Congress to reinstate federal funding for post-
conviction defender organizations.
[Vol. 63:487
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6. Proceedings in each phase of capital cases should be scheduled at a pace
that permits counsel for the individual facing the death penalty adequate
time for investigation, fact development, and decision making.
7. States should provide for an automatic stay of execution during the
completion of one complete round of litigation, including direct appeal,
certiorari, state post-conviction and appeal and certiorari there from,
federal habeas corpus and appeal and certiorari there from, and
clemency.
II. PROCEDURAL RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITS ON HABEAS CORPUS
A. Overview
The availability of state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus relief
through collateral review of state court judgments long has been an integral part
of the capital punishment process. Numerous capital convictions and death
sentences have been set aside in such proceedings as a result of, among others,
successful claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, claims made possible by
the discovery of crucial new evidence, claims based upon prosecutorial
misconduct, and new constitutional holdings of the federal courts.
The importance of such collateral review to the fair administration of justice
in capital cases cannot be overstated. Because so many capital defendants receive
inadequate counsel at trial and on direct appeal, state post-conviction proceedings
often provide the first real opportunity to establish claims of innocence, pursue
claims based upon newly developed facts, or prove constitutional errors that
infected the earlier proceedings.
But if counsel for death row inmates (whether appointed, retained, or pro
bono) fail to develop and present meritorious claims in post-conviction
proceedings, those claims generally are forfeited forever because no federal
remedy exists for ineffective or even grossly incompetent post-conviction
counsel. For example, in a situation involving two co-defendants, one of whom
obtains relief in federal court as a result of claims properly raised in accordance
with state post-conviction procedural rules, the other can be barred from raising
the identical claim in the same federal court because of his counsel's failure to
raise the claim properly in state court.
Despite the critical importance of competent, experienced, and properly
compensated counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, however, the
availability and appointment of such counsel for capital representation is the
exception, not the rule.
Compounding the problem of inadequate counsel is the fact that securing
relief on meritorious federal constitutional claims in state post-conviction
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proceedings or federal habeas corpus proceedings has become increasingly
difficult in recent years because of more restrictive state procedural rules and
practices and more stringent federal standards and time limits for review of state
court judgments. Under changes in state laws, for example, a death row inmate
whose trial, appellate, or state post-conviction counsel mistakenly fails to raise
claims in accordance with state procedures now can be precluded from raising
fundamental issues that, if heard, would have entitled him to substantial relief,
including release from custody, a new trial, or a new sentencing hearing, in either
state or federal court.
In addition, U.S. Supreme Court decisions and the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the AEDPA) have greatly limited the ability
of a death row inmate to return to federal court a second time. For example, under
AEDPA a death row inmate generally cannot raise a claim in a second habeas
corpus proceeding, regardless of whether the claim is meritorious and the
petitioner could not have presented it earlier, unless there is extremely strong
proof of the inmate's factual innocence, even if the meritorious claim relates only
to the death sentence and not the underlying conviction.
Supreme Court decisions also have made it impossible in most circumstances
for death row inmates who consistently have raised meritorious constitutional
claims at every opportunity to obtain relief if the Court itself has not resolved the
issue before the inmate's direct appeal ends.
Another factor limiting grants of federal habeas corpus relief is the more
frequent invocation of the harmless error doctrine; under recent decisions,
prosecutors no longer are required to show that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to defeat meritorious constitutional claims.
Other developments that contribute to unfair results include a one-year statute
of limitations on bringing federal habeas proceedings; tight restrictions on
evidentiary hearings with respect to facts not presented in state court (no matter
how great the justification for the omission) unless there is a convincing claim of
innocence; and a requirement in some circumstances that federal courts defer to
state court rulings that the Constitution has not been violated, even if the federal
courts believe that the rulings are erroneous.
Changes permitting or requiring courts to decline consideration of valid
constitutional claims, as well as the federal government's de-funding of resource
centers for federal habeas proceedings in capital cases, have been justified as
necessary to discourage frivolous claims in federal courts. In fact, however, a
principal effect of these changes has been to prevent death row inmates from
having valid claims heard or reviewed at all.
State courts and legislators could alleviate some of the unfairness these
developments have created if there were greater awareness of the changes and
their unfair consequences. It generally is assumed that judicial review is an
important means of ensuring the fairness of the death penalty, but that assumption
increasingly is wrong. Numerous rounds of judicial review may not result in
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consideration of the merits of the inmate's claim or even consideration of
compelling new evidence that comes to light shortly before an execution. Under
current procedures, a "full and fair judicial review" often does not include
reviewing the merits of the inmate's claims.
B. Guidelines for Review of Procedural Restrictions and Limits on Habeas
Corpus
1. Does the jurisdiction conduct post-conviction proceedings in a manner
that permits adequate development and judicial consideration of the
petitioner's claims?
a. In the face of execution dates, do courts stay executions to permit
full development and consideration of the claims?
b. When stays are granted, do courts press to complete the proceedings
in order to limit the duration of the stay?
c. When no execution date has been set, are proceedings conducted in a
deliberate fashion or are they affected by concerns about delays?
d. Do courts exercise independent judgment in deciding claims rather
than relying on findings and conclusion prepared by the State?
2. Does the State provide meaningful discovery in post-conviction
proceedings?
3. When deciding post-conviction claims on appeal, do appellate courts
explicitly address the issues of law and fact?
4. What standard do state appellate courts use in deciding whether to
consider claims of constitutional error that were not raised properly at
trial or on appeal?
5. What standard do state appellate courts use in deciding whether to review
errors of state law that were not raised properly at trial or on appeal?
6. On the initial state post-conviction application, what standard do state
post-conviction courts use in reviewing the merits of claims of
constitutional error not preserved properly at trial or on appeal?
7. Has the state established and sufficiently funded a post-conviction
defense organization similar in nature to the capital resources centers de-
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funded by Congress in 1996? If so, does this organization deal with state
post-conviction, federal habeas corpus, and clemency proceedings in
capital cases?
8. What standards exist for counsel appointed for state post-conviction
proceedings in capital cases? If so, are these standards consistent with the
recommendations above in Part I(C)?
9. Do counsel handling state post-conviction proceedings in capital cases
receive adequate compensation and sufficient funding for support
services, including investigators and experts?
10. What retroactivity rules are applicable in state capital proceedings,
including second and successive post-conviction proceedings?
11. To what extent do state courts, in adjudicating capital cases, consider
holdings of federal appeals and district courts, as well as U.S. Supreme
Court decisions?
12. Do the jurisdiction's procedures in capital cases provide a mechanism in
successive post-conviction proceedings to consider meritorious claims
not properly raised previously, because of either counsel incompetence
or prosecutorial misconduct or because of claims that have become
newly available because of intervening court decisions?
13. What harmless error rule do state courts use in post-conviction
proceedings?
C. Recommendations for Addressing Procedural Restrictions and Limits
on Habeas Corpus
1. All post-conviction proceedings at the trial court level should be
conducted in a manner designed to permit adequate development and
judicial consideration of all claims.
a. Trial courts should not expedite post-conviction proceedings
unfairly; if necessary, courts should stay executions to permit full
and deliberate consideration of claims.
b. Courts should exercise independent judgment in deciding cases,
making findings of fact and conclusions only after fully and carefully
considering the evidence and the applicable law.
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2. The State should provide meaningful discovery in post-conviction
proceedings. Where courts have discretion to permit such discovery, the
discretion should be exercised to ensure full discovery.
3. Trial judges should provide sufficient time for discovery and should not
curtail discovery as a means of expediting the proceedings.
4. When deciding post-conviction claims on appeal, state appellate courts
should address explicitly the issues of fact and law raised by the claims
and should issue orders that fully explain the bases for dispositions of
claims.
5. State appellate courts should apply a "knowing, understanding and
voluntary" standard for waivers of claims of constitutional error not
raised properly at trial or on appeal and should apply a plain error rule
applied liberally with respect to errors of state law in capital cases.
6. On the initial state post-conviction application, state post-conviction
courts should apply a "knowing, understanding and voluntary" standard
for waivers of claims of constitutional error not preserved properly at
trial or on appeal.
7. The states should establish post-conviction defense organizations, similar
in nature to the capital resources centers de-funded by Congress in 1996,
to represent capital defendants in state post-conviction, federal habeas
corpus, and clemency proceedings.
8. For state post-conviction proceedings, the state should appoint counsel
whose qualifications are consistent with the recommendations in Part
I(C), above. The state should compensate appointed counsel adequately
and, as necessary, provide sufficient funds for investigators and experts.
9. State courts should give full retroactive effect to U. S. Supreme Court
decisions in all proceedings, including second and successive post-
conviction proceedings, and should consider in such proceedings the
decisions of federal appeals and district courts.
10. State courts should permit second and successive post-conviction
proceedings in capital cases where counsels' omissions or intervening
court decisions resulted in possibly meritorious claims not previously
being raised, factually or legally developed, or accepted as legally valid.
11. In post-conviction proceedings, state courts should apply the harmless
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error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), which
requires the prosecution to show that a constitutional error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
12. During the course of a moratorium, a "blue ribbon" commission should
undertake a review of all cases in which individuals have been either
wrongfully convicted or wrongfully sentenced to death and should
recommend ways to prevent such wrongful results in the future.
HIL. CLEMENCY PROCEEDINGS
A. Overview
Clemency is the act of a governor or state executive body either to commute
a death sentence to life imprisonment or to grant a pardon for a criminal offense.
The clemency process traditionally was intended to function as a final safeguard
to evaluate thoroughly and fairly whether a person should be put to death. The
process cannot fulfill that critical function, however, when exercise of the
clemency power is influenced more by political considerations than by the
fundamental principles ofjustice, fairness, and mercy that underlie the power.
It is essential that govemors and clemency boards recognize that the
clemency power requires an inquiry into the faimess of carrying out an execution
in each case in which clemency is sought. In recent years, however, clemency has
been granted in substantially fewer cases than it was prior to the U. S. Supreme
Court's 1972 decision declaring the death penalty unconstitutional.4 Among the
factors accounting for this decline may be a changing political climate that
encourages "tougher" criminal penalties and the erroneous belief that clemency is
unnecessary today because death row inmates receive "super due process" in the
courts.
In fact, the need for a meaningful clemency power is more important than
ever. Because of restrictions on judicial review of meritorious claims, including
those involving actual innocence,5 clemency often is the State's last and only
opportunity to prevent miscarriages of justice. A clemency decision maker may
be the only person or body that has the opportunity to evaluate all of the factors
bearing on the appropriateness of the death sentence without regard to constraints
that may limit a court's or jury's decision making. Yet, as the capital punishment
process currently functions, meaningful review frequently is not obtained,
although procedural rules are served.
The State's clemency authority exists precisely to ensure that justice is done
when all else fails. Full and proper use of the clemency process is essential to
guaranteeing fairness in death penalty administration.
4 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5 See supra Part I(A).
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B. Guidelines for Review of Clemency Proceedings
1. What limitations exist concerning the scope, operation, or application of
clemency decisions? What is the articulated justification for such
limitations?
2. Is consideration given, during the clemency process, to:
a. Constitutional claims (a) that were held barred in court proceedings
due to procedural default, non-retroactivity, abuse of the writ,
statutes of limitations, or similar doctrines, or (b) whose merits the
federal courts did not reach because they gave deference to possibly
erroneous, but not "unreasonable," state court rulings;
b. Constitutional claims that were found to have merit but did not
involve errors that were deemed sufficiently prejudicial to warrant
judicial relief;
c. Lingering doubts of guilt;
d. Facts that no fact-finder ever considered during judicial proceedings,
where such facts could have affected determinations of guilt or
sentence or the validity of constitutional claims; and
e. Patterns of racial or geographic disparity in carrying out the death
penalty in the jurisdiction?
3. Are death row inmates provided counsel and access to investigative and
expert services prior to and during clemency proceedings?
a. How are counsel compensated?
b. Are counsel provided sufficient time to investigate and otherwise
prepare for clemency proceedings?
4. Are clemency proceedings formally conducted in public? If so, by
whom?
5. If the clemency authority is exercised by an official who previously
participated in the administration of the death penalty as a prosecutor or
state attorney general, what safeguards are in place to ensure that the
authority is insulated, to the extent possible, from conflicts of interests?
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6. How are clemency decision makers educated about their responsibilities
and their powers concerning clemency decisions?
7. How are clemency decisions insulated from political considerations?
C. Recommendations for Improving Clemency Proceedings
1. The clemency decision making process should not assume that the courts
have reached the merits on all issues bearing on the death sentence in a
given case; decisions should be based upon an independent consideration
of facts and circumstances.
2. The clemency decision making process should take into account all
factors that might lead the decision maker to conclude that death is not
the appropriate punishment.
3. Clemency decision makers should consider as factors in their
deliberations any patterns of racial or geographic disparity in carrying out
the death penalty in the jurisdiction, including the exclusion of racial
minorities from the jury panels that convicted and sentenced the death
row inmate.
4. In a jurisdiction that does not bar the execution of mentally retarded
offenders, those with serious mental illness, those who were juveniles at
the time of their offenses, or those whose cases pose a lingering doubt
about guilt, clemency proceedings should include consideration of such
factors.
5. Clemency decision makers should consider as factors in their
deliberations an inmate's possible rehabilitation or performance of
significant positive acts while on death row.
6. In clemency proceedings, the death row inmates should be represented
by counsel whose qualifications are consistent with the recommendations
in Part I(C), above.
7. Prior to clemency hearings, death row inmates' counsel should be
entitled to compensation and access to investigative and expert resources.
Counsel also should be provided sufficient time both to develop the basis
for any factors upon which clemency might be granted that previously
were not developed and to rebut any evidence that the State may present
in opposing clemency.
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8. Clemency proceedings should be formally conducted in public and
presided over by the governor or other officials involved in making the
clemency determination.
9. If two or more individuals are responsible for clemency decisions or for
making recommendations to clemency decision makers, their decisions
or recommendations should be made only after in-person meetings with
clemency petitioners.
10. Clemency decision makers should be fully educated, and should
encourage education of the public, concerning the broad-based nature of
clemency powers and the limitations on the judicial system's ability to
grant relief under circumstances that might warrant grants of clemency.
11. To the maximum extent possible, clemency determinations should be
insulated from political considerations or impacts.
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Overview
In virtually all jurisdictions that authorize capital punishment, jurors in capital
cases have the "awesome responsibility" of deciding whether another person will
live or die.6 Jurors, prosecutors, defendants, and the general public rely upon state
trial judges to present fully and accurately, through jury instructions, the
applicable law to be followed in jurors' decision making. Often, however,
sentencing instructions are poorly written and conveyed. As a result, instructions
often serve only to confuse, not to communicate; jurors do not understand basic
principles governing the imposition of capital punishment.
It is important that trial judges impress upon jurors the full extent of their
responsibility to decide whether the defendant will live or die or to make their
advisory recommendation on sentencing. Some trial courts, whether intentionally
or not, give instructions that may lead jurors to misunderstand their responsibility
or to believe that reviewing courts independently will determine what the
sentence should be. In some cases, jurors conclude that their decisions are not
vitally important in determining whether a defendant will live or die.
It also is important that courts ensure that jurors make their decisions based
upon accurate facts. For example, if jurors do not believe that a sentence of "life
without parole" really means that the offender will remain in prison for the rest of
his life, or if they substantially underestimate the amount of time that a life-
sentenced offender must serve before becoming eligible for parole, they
6 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985).
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misguidedly may impose a death sentence to ensure the person never will be free
without realizing that they could have accomplished the same result by sentencing
the offender to life in prison. Nowhere is a miscarriage ofjustice more likely than
in a capital case in which jurors mistakenly believe that a defendant who is not
sentenced to death may be released within a few years.
B. Guidelines for Review of Jury Instructions
1. Do trial courts in the jurisdiction expressly instruct jurors concerning the
"awesome power" to decide between life and death and, in jurisdictions
where the jury recommendation is advisory, the full significance of their
recommendation?
2. Do court instructions effectively convey the applicable law to jurors?
a. Are the instructions clearly organized and presented?
b. Are the instructions void of complex sentences, clauses embedded
within clauses, double negatives, nouns created from verbs, or other
unclear language?
c. Are the instructions objectively written to avoid presumptions in
favor of a death sentence?
d. Do the instructions cover all aspects of applicable law and jurors'
responsibilities for applying it?
3. Do court instructions aid understanding and recall of instructions?
a. Do trial courts provide jurors with copies of the instructions to read
along while the courts are instructing them?
b. Do the trial courts provide jurors with copies of instructions to
review during deliberations?
4. Do jury instructions fully and accurately address mitigating
circumstances?
a. Do the instructions clearly explain the meaning of the terms,
"mitigation" and "mitigating circumstances"?
b. Do the instructions clearly state that any juror can act on his/her
belief that a mitigating circumstance exists, regardless of whether
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other jurors agree?
c. Do the instructions clearly and accurately state the defendant's
burden of proof with regard to mitigating circumstances?
d. Do the instructions fully and accurately explain the difference
between the burden of proof that applies to a juror's finding of a
mitigating circumstance and the burden of proof that applies to a
jury's finding of guilt or an aggravating circumstance?
e. Do the instructions clearly indicate that jurors can and must consider
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense" that could be "the basis for a sentence
less than death?"
7
f Do the instructions clearly indicate that jurors can find mitigating
circumstances other than those set forth in the statute?
g. Do the instructions clearly indicate that jurors can consider residual
doubt to be mitigating?
h. If the jurisdiction's statutory description of mitigating circumstances
contains words of degree (e.g., "extreme," as in "the defendant acted
under extreme duress"), do the instructions make clear that jurors
can find mitigating circumstances in those instances even if the
circumstances are not "substantial" or "extreme"?
i. If applicable in the jurisdiction, do the instructions clearly indicate
that a juror can vote for a life sentence, even where an aggravating
circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and even
in the absence of any mitigating circumstance, if the juror's reasoned
moral judgment is that a life sentence is more appropriate for the
defendant than the death sentence?
j. If applicable in the jurisdiction, do the instructions make it clear that
in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, the relative numbers
of aggravating versus mitigating factors is not determinative of the
outcome?
5. Do jury instructions fully and accurately address aggravating
circumstances?
7 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
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a. Do the instructions clearly explain that jurors must be unanimous in
finding an aggravating circumstance?
b. Do the instructions explain the difference between the legal meaning
of "aggravation" and its meaning in everyday usage?
6. How are clarifying instructions provided?
a. When jurors ask for clarification of instructions, what is the practice
followed by the trial courts?
b. When jurors ask for clarification of instructions, does the law of the
jurisdiction require a trial court to explain the instruction rather than
merely repeat the instruction?
7. How are instructions on sentencing alternatives provided?
a. Is the trial court required to instruct the jury on the nature of all
sentencing options available to the jurors?
b. If the jurisdiction provides for life without parole as an alternative to
a death sentence, are trial courts required to explain the meaning of
"life without parole"?
c. If the jurisdiction provides that a jury has the option of sentencing a
defendant to a prison term that is less than life without parole, are
trial courts required to instruct the jury on (a) the minimum length of
time that a capital defendant must serve before he would be eligible
for parole, given his record of convictions and (b) the actual parole
practices in the jurisdiction?
d. Does the jurisdiction permit or require a parole official to testify, at
the defense's request, about parole practices in the state to clarify
jurors' understanding of alternative sentences during the sentencing
phase of the trial?
8. Does the jurisdiction bar jurors from imposing a death sentence where,
"although the evidence suffices to sustain a verdict, it does not foreclose
all doubt respecting the defendant's guilt?
8
8 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(1)(0.
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C. Recommendations for Improving Jury Instructions
1. Each capital punishment jurisdiction should work with attorneys, judges,
linguists, social scientists, psychologists, and jurors themselves to
evaluate the extent to which jurors understand capital jury instructions,
revise the instructions as necessary to ensure that jurors understand
applicable law, and monitor the extent to which jurors understand the
revised instructions to permit further revision as necessary.
2. Jurors should receive written copies of court instructions to consult while
the court is instructing them and while conducting deliberations.
3. Trial courts should respond meaningfully to jurors' requests for
clarification of instructions by explaining the legal concepts at issue and
meanings of words that may have different meanings in everyday usage
and, where appropriate, by directly answering jurors' questions about
applicable law.
4. Trial courts should instruct jurors clearly on applicable law in the
jurisdiction concerning alternative punishments and should, at the
defendant's request during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, permit
parole officials or other knowledgeable witnesses to testify about parole
practices in the state to clarify jurors' understanding of alternative
sentences.
5. Trial courts should instruct jurors that a juror may return a life sentence,
even in the absence of any mitigating factor and even where an
aggravating factor has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, if the
juror does not believe that the defendant should receive the death penalty.
6. Jurisdictions should consider having trial courts instruct jurors that
residual doubt about the defendant's guilt is a mitigating factor. Further,
jurisdictions should consider implementing the provision of Model Penal
Code Section 210.6(1)(f), under which residual doubt concerning the
defendant's guilt would, by law, require a sentence less than death.
7. In states where it is applicable, trial courts should make clear in juror
instructions that the weighing process for considering aggravating and
mitigating factors should not be conducted by determining whether there
are a greater number of aggravating factors than mitigating factors.
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V. AN INDEPENDENT, VIGILANT JUDICIARY
A. Overview
Judicial independence assumes that judges will decide cases to the best of
their abilities without political or other bias and, where necessary to protect the
constitution and laws, in the face of official and public opposition. In fact,
however, elections, appointments, and confirmations of judges increasingly are
being influenced by consideration of judicial nominees' or candidates' purported
views on the death penalty or of judges' decisions in capital cases.
During election campaigns, judicial candidates increasingly seem to be
expected to assure the public that they will be "tough on crime," that they will
impose the death penalty whenever possible and that, if appellate judges, they will
uphold death sentences. In retention campaigns, judges are asked to defend
decisions in capital cases and sometimes are defeated because of decisions that
are unpopular even though they are based upon a reasonable application of law.
Prospective and actual nominees for judicial appointments often are subjected to
scrutiny on these same bases.
This erosion ofjudicial independence increases the possibility that judges will
be selected, elevated, and retained in office by a process that ignores the larger
interests of justice and fairness, and instead focuses narrowly on the alleged
conduct of capital defendants. As a result, some judges may decide cases not on
the basis of their best understanding of the law, but rather on the basis of the
effects of their decisions on their careers. Others will act independently-some at
expense to their careers. Either way, judicial independence is sacrificed. The
Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits judicial candidates from making
"pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office." 9 Several years ago, U.S. Supreme Court
Justice John Paul Stevens observed that "[1]t was never contemplated that the
individual who has to protect our individual rights would have to consider what
decision would produce the most votes." With increasing frequency, however,
such considerations predominate during elections and in connection with judicial
appointment and confirmation proceedings.
Judges also are expected to be vigilant against conduct that undermines
justice, particularly prosecutorial misconduct and incompetent representation by
defense counsel. In capital cases, prosecutorial misconduct can take many forms,
including failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, subordination of perjury by
informants and jailhouse snitches, or requests that jurors sentence the defendant to
death based upon passion, prejudice, religious arguments, or other factors
inappropriate and unfair for imposition of death sentences. Where judges witness
such conduct, they have an obligation to take effective measures both to remedy
9 Canon 5A(d)(i) (1990).
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the harm and to prevent such conduct in the future.
Judges also should ensure that defendants receive a full and effective defense.
Judges who appoint incompetent counsel or ignore evidence of incompetence in
their courts contribute to the miscarriage of justice. Judges serve as the nation's
front line against injustice and unfairness; that function is never more important
than in a capital case.
B. Guidelines for Review of Judicial Independence and Vigilance
1. Have candidates for election, re-election, appointment, or re-appointment
to judicial positions in the jurisdiction made promises concerning future
decisions affecting capital cases?
a. If so, are ethics proceedings ever initiated against those who engage
in such conduct?
b. Are the existing ethical rules adequate to prevent or sanction such
conduct?
2. Are judges who seek re-appointment or appointment to new or higher
positions asked the percentage of capital cases in which they have upheld
the death penalty? If so, how have they answered such questions?
3. Have political factors affected, or given the appearance of affecting,
judges' decisions in capital cases in the jurisdiction?
a. If so, are ethics proceedings ever instituted against any such judges?
b. Are existing ethical standards adequate to guard against such
improper influence?
4. Is there a perception or appearance in the jurisdiction that political factors
have affected the selection of judges to preside over or review capital
cases?
a. Are judges who are perceived to be insufficiently supportive of the
death penalty prevented from presiding over such cases at the trial
level?
b. Are such judges prevented from sitting on appeals of such cases?
5. Have judges been criticized for rulings in support of constitutional rights
of capital defendants or death row inmates? If so, have bar associations
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and other community leaders in the jurisdiction spoken out in defense of
their actions as an exercise ofjudicial independence?
6. Have bar associations and other community leaders in the jurisdiction
publicly opposed questioning of potential candidates for judicial
appointment or re-appointment concerning the percentage of capital
cases in which they have upheld the death penalty?
7. What efforts have been undertaken to educate the public about the
respective roles and responsibilities of judges and attorneys in capital
cases and the importance of upholding constitutional guarantees for all
defendants, including capital defendants? Who has conducted such
efforts?
8. How do judges in the jurisdiction respond to evidence that counsel for
capital defendants or death row inmates are performing ineffectively?,
a. Do judges act to protect the rights of defendants or inmates in such
situations?
b. Do courts or bar associations take action against lawyers who
provide inadequate representation?
9. How do judges in the jurisdiction respond to evidence that counsel for
the State are or may be engaging in misconduct in capital cases?
a. Do judges act frmnly to remedy the misconduct and take effective
steps to prevent such misconduct in the future?
b. Do courts or bar associations take action against prosecutors who
engage in misconduct?
10. Do judges implement adequate measures to correct situations in which
prosecutors fail to provide appropriate discovery to the defense in capital
cases?
11. Are judges authorized to bar the death penalty on remand in cases where
convictions or death sentences are vacated because the State withheld
exculpatory evidence?
12. To what extent and under what circumstances has the State successfully
invoked the harmless error doctrine as a defense against a claim of
prosecutorial misconduct?
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C. Recommendations for Ensuring Judicial Independence and Vigilance
1. States should examine the fairness of their processes for the
appointment/election of judges and should educate the public about the
importance of judicial independence to the fair administration of justice
and the effect of unfair practices in compromising the independence of
the judiciary.
2. A judge who has made any promise-public or private-regarding his
prospective decisions in capital cases that amounts to prejudgment
should not preside over any capital case or review any death penalty
decision in the jurisdiction.
3. Bar associations and community leaders should speak out in defense of
sitting judges who are criticized for decisions in capital cases, particularly
when the judges are unable, pursuant to standards of judicial conduct, to
speak out themselves.
a. Bar associations should educate the public concerning the roles and
responsibilities of judges and lawyers in capital cases, particularly
concerning the importance of understanding that violations of
substantive constitutional rights are not "technicalities" and that
judges and lawyers are bound to protect those rights for all
defendants.
b. Bar associations and community leaders publicly should oppose any
questioning of candidates for judicial appointment or re-appointment
concerning the percentages of capital cases in which they have
upheld the death penalty.
c. Purported views on the death penalty or on habeas corpus should not
be litmus tests or important factors in the selection of judges.
4. A judge who observes ineffective lawyering by defense counsel should
inquire into counsel's performance and, where appropriate, take effective
actions to ensure that the defendant receives a proper defense.
5. A judge who determines that prosecutorial misconduct or other activity
unfair to the defendant has occurred during a capital case should take
immediate action authorized in the jurisdiction to address the situation
and to ensure that the capital proceeding is fair.
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6. The State should ensure that full discovery is available to defendants in
all capital cases.
7. Judges should do all within their power to ensure that defendants are
provided with full discovery in all capital cases.
8. During the course of a moratorium, a "blue ribbon" task force with
subpoena powers should undertake a full examination of capital cases in
which prosecutorial misconduct was either established or seriously
alleged and should develop recommendations on ways to prevent such
misconduct and its impact on capital cases in the future.
PART Two: VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IN DEATH PENALTY
ADMINISTRATION
I. RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITIES
A. Overview
In the past 25 years, numerous studies have found that, when significant non-
racial factors affecting the death penalty are held constant, race is a major factor
influencing decisions to seek and impose the death penalty. After reviewing these
studies, the U.S. General Accounting Office, an independent federal agency,
found this conclusion to be valid. Most of the studies have found that the death
penalty is sought and imposed significantly more often when the murder victim is
white than when the victim is African American. Studies also have found that in
some jurisdictions, the death penalty has been sought and imposed more
frequently in cases involving African American defendants than in cases
involving defendants of other races.'0
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987), that such evidence of systemic racial disparity in capital cases does not
establish a federal constitutional violation. At the same time, the Court invited
legislative bodies to consider adopting legislation that would permit courts to
grant relief to defendants based upon the type of evidence of systematic racial
disparity presented in McCleskey.
The pattem of racial discrimination persists today, in part because courts
often tolerate bias by prosecutors, defense lawyers, trial judges, and juries that can
infect the entire trial process. Specific problem areas include discrimination by
prosecutors in choosing which cases to prosecute as capital murder cases;
ineffective assistance of counsel in not objecting to systemic discrimination and
10 See Resources Appendix for selected studies, available at
www.abanet.org/irr/finaiJune28.pdf.
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pursuing discrimination claims; discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to
obtain all-white or largely all-white juries; racial insensitivity or outright racism of
jurors, judges, prosecutors, law enforcement officials, and defense lawyers; and
the lack of a reliable mechanism for defendants to raise claims of racial
discrimination.
There is little dispute about the need to eliminate race as a factor in the
administration of the death penalty. But states have yet to address discrimination
in the justice system generally, and the capital punishment system specifically, in
a comprehensive way. To eliminate the impact of race in death penalty
administration, the ways in which race infects the system must be identified and
strategies must be devised to root out the discriminatory practices.
B. Guidelines for Review of Treatment of Racial and Ethnic Minorities in
Death Penalty Administration
1. Have any studies been undertaken to determine the impact of racial
discrimination on administration of the death penalty in the jurisdiction?
If so, what are the results?
2. Where patterns of racial discrimination have been shown to exist in the
jurisdiction's capital punishment system, what steps, if any, have been
taken to address the problem?
3. What data does the jurisdiction collect to monitor the continuing impact
of race on administration of the death penalty?
4. Is the jurisdiction collecting data about the racial composition of the
state's death row inmates, the race of defendants, and the race of victims
in all actual and potentially capital cases (i.e., cases in which, regardless
of whether prosecuted as first degree murder cases, the alleged facts, if
proven, would have made the defendant eligible for the death penalty)
that have been prosecuted in the state during the same years in which the
state's death row inmates were prosecuted, as well as the aggravating and
mitigating factors present, charged, and found in all such cases?
5. Does the jurisdiction permit a defendant or convicted offender to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that his/her
case fits into an established racially discriminatory pattern? If so, does
the prosecution have the burden of rebutting such a showing or does a
minimal denial of a motive to discriminate suffice?
6. What educational efforts has the government undertaken to train
prosecutors and defense counsel concerning the impropriety of using
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racial factors in jury selection, in decisions to seek the death penalty, or
in other aspects of capital cases?
a. Does the jurisdiction assist prosecutors in developing racially neutral
factors to consider in deciding when to seek the death penalty in a
given case?
b. Does the State assist defense counsel at every phase of the process in
identifying and developing claims of racial discrimination in capital
cases?
7. Do judges instruct jurors on the impropriety of considering racial factors
in decision making?
a. Does the jurisdiction require judges to offer defense counsel the
opportunity to question prospective jurors about racial bias?
b. Do judges permit defense counsel to question prospective jurors
outside the presence of other jurors?
c. Are jurors instructed to report conduct that they perceive to be racist
or discriminatory?
8. How effective are procedures for requiring judges to recuse themselves
because of reasonable concerns that their performance in a given case
could be affected by racially discriminatory factors?
9. Are defendants permitted to raise directly meritorious claims of racial
discrimination at any stage of capital proceedings?
C. Recommendations for Addressing Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in
Death Penalty Administration
1. Jurisdictions should fully investigate and evaluate the impact of racial
discrimination in their criminal justice systems and develop strategies
that strive to eliminate it.
2. Jurisdictions should collect and maintain data on the race of defendants
and victims, on the circumstances of the crime, on all aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, and on the nature and strength of the evidence
for all potentially capital cases (regardless of whether the case is charged,
prosecuted, or disposed of as a capital case). This data should be
collected and maintained with respect to every stage of the criminal
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justice process, from reporting of the crime through execution of the
sentence.
3. Jurisdictions should collect and review all valid studies already
undertaken to determine the impact of racial discrimination on their
administration of the death penalty and should identify and carry out any
additional studies that would help determine discriminatory impacts on
capital cases. In conducting new studies, states should collect data by
race for any aspect of the death penalty in which race could be a factor.
4. Where patterns of racial discrimination are found in any phase of the
death penalty administration, jurisdictions should develop, in
consultation with legal scholars, practitioners, and other appropriate
experts, effective remedial and prevention strategies to address the
discrimination.
5. Jurisdictions should adopt legislation explicitly stating that no person
shall be put to death in accordance with a sentence sought or imposed as
a result of the race of the defendant or the race of the victim. To enforce
such a law, jurisdictions should permit defendants and inmates to
establish prima facie cases of discrimination based upon proof that their
cases are part of established racially discriminatory patterns. If such a
prima facie case is established, the State should have the burden of
rebutting it by substantial evidence.
6. Jurisdictions should develop and implement educational programs
applicable to all parts of the criminal justice system to stress that race
should not be a factor in any aspect of death penalty administration. To
ensure that such programs are effective, jurisdictions also should impose
meaningful sanctions against any State actor found to have acted on the
basis of race in a capital case.
7. Defense counsel should be trained to identify and develop racial
discrimination claims in capital cases. Jurisdictions also should ensure
that defense counsel are trained to identify biased jurors during voir dire.
8. Jurisdictions should require jury instructions that it is improper to
consider any racial factors in their decision making and that they should
report any evidence of racial discrimination injury deliberations.
9. Jurisdictions should ensure that judges recuse themselves from capital
cases when any party in a given case establishes a reasonable basis for
concluding that the judge's decision making could be affected by racially
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discriminatory factors.
10. States should permit defendants or inmates to raise directly claims of
racial discrimination in the imposition of death sentences at any stage of
judicial proceedings, notwithstanding any procedural rule that otherwise
might bar such claims, unless the State proves in a given case that a
defendant or inmate has knowingly and intelligently waived the claim.
II. JUVENILE OFFENDERS
A. Overview
The American Bar Association unconditionally opposes the execution of
individuals for crimes they committed when under the age of eighteen ("juvenile
offenders"). Juvenile offenders are not mature enough to .understand, in a real
sense, the consequences of their actions; many suffer from the effects of terrible
childhoods; and juveniles are more prone than adults to make false confessions or
engage in other immature conduct that unfairly results in a death sentence.
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the execution of offenders younger than sixteen years old at the time of
their crimes is "cruel and unusual" punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In
Stanford v. Kentucky, 192 U.S. 361 (1989), however, the Court concluded that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit execution of juveniles who were at least
sixteen years old at the time they committed capital offenses. From January 1973
through June 2000 in this country, twenty-two states imposed a total of 196 death
sentences upon juvenile offenders. Appellate courts have reversed a majority of
these sentences but, between September 1985 and June 2000, states executed
seventeen people for crimes committed as juveniles. As of June 2000, seventy-
four inmates were on death row for crimes they committed as juveniles.
States have the power to change the administration of the death penalty in
juvenile offender cases. For example, the execution of sixteen and seventeen-
year-old juveniles might violate provisions of a state's constitution. Of course,
states also are free to set the minimum age for capital punishment higher than
sixteen years old; indeed, fifteen of the thirty-eight states that authorize capital
punishment, along with the federal government, have set the minimum age at
eighteen.
Since 1990, other countries that have executed juvenile offenders include
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Those countries together have executed
a total of eight juvenile offenders. In the same period, there have been fourteen
such executions in the United States. The United States has signed, but not
ratified, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which bars
capital punishment for juveniles; in doing so, the United States has deferred to the
individual states concerning application of the death penalty to juvenile offenders.
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B. Guidelines for Reviewing the Application of the Death Penalty to
Juvenile Offenders
1. Does the jurisdiction permit the execution of offenders who were under
age eighteen when they committed capital offenses?
2. Are there any juvenile offenders on the jurisdiction's death row?
C. Recommendations Concerning the Application of the Death Penalty to
Juvenile Offenders
1. All jurisdictions that have not done so should abolish the death penalty
for all individuals who were under age eighteen when they committed
capital offenses.
2. All jurisdictions should commute the death sentences of all individuals
currently on death row who were under age eighteen when they
committed capital offenses.
3. The United States should ratify the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, without a reservation concerning the ban on capital
punishment for offenses committed by juveniles who were under age
eighteen when they committed capital offenses.
Ill. MENTALLY RETARDED AND MENTALLY ILL DEFENDANTS AND
OFFENDERS
A. Overview
Mental Retardation
The ABA unconditionally opposes imposition of the death penalty on
offenders with mental retardation. It is beyond the ability of the criminal justice
system adequately to ensure the fairness of such death sentences. Yet twenty-four
of the thirty-eight states with capital punishment continue to permit the execution
of mentally retarded offenders (although four more states are considering bans
this year), and death rows across the country are populated by mentally retarded
inmates, some of whom likely never have been identified as such. Although the
U.S. Supreme Court held in 1989 that it was not unconstitutional to execute a
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mentally retarded offender, it will reconsider that question in a case next term.'1
The American Association on Mental Retardation defines a person as
mentally retarded if the person's IQ (general intellectual functioning) is in the
lowest 2.5% of the population, if two or more of the person's adaptive skills are
significantly limited, and if these two conditions were present before the person
reached the age of eighteen. Mental retardation limits a person's ability to learn,
reason, plan, understand, judge, discriminate, or exercise restraint.
A person's mental retardation can be significant at every stage of a capital
case, including initial police questioning, determination of competency to stand
trial, the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, the sentencing phase, and all
subsequent proceedings, including consideration of clemency. However, because
a mentally retarded person often becomes adept at masking the disability in an
effort to avoid stigmatization, a lawyer representing a client who has mental
retardation may not realize the existence or scope of retardation or may not
appreciate the client's extremely limited capacity to assist in the proceedings. A
prosecutor, in turn, may seek the death penalty for, and a, jury or judge may
impose it upon, a mentally retarded individual without understanding the
defendant's disability and consequently without giving the disability substantial
weight as a mitigating factor in the sentencing decision.
In addition, mentally retarded individuals sometimes are charged as
principals in crimes in which their participation is the result of their retardation.
For example, a mentally retarded person may join in the criminal activity of
others in order to appear "normal" to them and gain their friendship without being
fully aware that the activity is criminal. Conversely, behavior associated with the
disability, if perceived as unusual or different, may trigger police attention more
readily because similar behavior exhibited by a person without mental retardation
would be considered suspicious.
Mentally retarded individuals also may be more susceptible to unfair criminal
punishment because they frequently do not fully appreciate the concepts of
blameworthiness that underlie criminal responsibility. As a result, they
inappropriately may blame themselves or assume responsibility for the criminal
conduct of others. In addition, persons with mental retardation are less likely than
other non-juveniles to appreciate the permanent consequences of their actions.
Mentally retarded individuals also are prone to false confessions because of
susceptibility to suggestion. Such a person is predisposed to tell an authority
figure what he thinks that person wants to hear and is reluctant to remain silent in
the face of questioning, even when he does not understand the question or does
not know the answer. Miranda warnings are virtually meaningless to many
mentally retarded individuals because the warning is written at the seventh-grade
level, beyond the comprehension of a person who has mental retardation.
" [See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1999), cert. granted sub. nom.
Atkins v. Virginia, 70 U.S.L.W. 3232 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001) (No. 00-8452), cert. grant amended
70 U.S.L.W. 3233.]
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Mental Illness
Although mental illness should be a mitigating factor in capital cases, juries
often mistakenly treat it as an aggravating factor. States, in turn, often have failed
to monitor or correct such unintended and unfair results.
State death penalty statutes based upon the Model Penal Code list three
mitigating factors that implicate mental illness: (1) whether the defendant was
under "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" at the time of the offense; (2)
whether "the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication"; and (3)
whether "the murder was committed under circumstances which the defendant
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation of his conduct."
Often, however, these factors are read to jurors without further explanation or
without any discussion of their relationship to mental illness. Without proper
instructions, most jurors are likely to view mental illness incorrectly as an
aggravating factor; indeed, research indicates that jurors routinely consider the
three statutory factors listed above as aggravating, rather than mitigating, factors
in cases involving mental illness. One study found specifically that jurors'
consideration of the factor, "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" in capital
cases correlated positively with decisions to impose death sentences.
Mental illness particularly weighs against a criminal defendant when it is
considered in the context of determining "future dangerousness," often a criterion
for imposing the death penalty. One study showed that a judge's instructions on
future dangerousness led mock jurors to believe that the death penalty was
mandatory for mentally ill defendants. In fact, only a small percentage of
mentally ill individuals are dangerous, and most of them respond successfully to
treatment. But the contrary perception unquestionably affects decisions in capital
cases.
Like mental retardation, mental illness affects every stage of a capital trial. It
is relevant to the defendant's competence to stand trial; it may provide a defense
to the murder charge; and it can be the centerpiece of the mitigation case.
Conversely, when the judge, prosecutor, and jurors are misinformed about the
nature of mental illness and its relevance to the defendant's culpability and life
experience, tragic consequences often follow for the defendant.
B. Guidelines for Reviewing the Treatment of Mental Retardation and
Mental Illness in Death Penalty Administration
Mental Retardation
1. Does the jurisdiction bar the execution of all mentally retarded
individuals?
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2. Are the jurisdiction's standards for determining mental retardation based
upon the definition of mental retardation promulgated by the American
Association on Mental Retardation?
3. To what extent does the jurisdiction specifically consider mental
retardation in assessing a person's mental culpability?
4. Does the jurisdiction have policies not to seek the death penalty against
mentally retarded defendants, to offer pleas to such defendants that
would avoid the death penalty, or not to seek the death penalty against
such defendants when they are not the actual killers?
5. If the jurisdiction does not bar the execution of all mentally retarded
individuals, does the jurisdiction take a person's mental retardation into
consideration as a factor in mitigation of the death penalty?
6. Does the jurisdiction have policies in place that ensure that mentally
retarded persons are represented by attorneys who fully appreciate the
significance of their client's mental limitations?
7. What policies does the jurisdiction have in place to protect a mentally
retarded defendant from "waiving" his constitutional rights under
circumstances in which his mental retardation could affect his ability to
make a judgment about a waiver?
8. How does the jurisdiction ensure that the "confession" of a mentally
retarded defendant is not false or obtained through manipulation?
9. If the jurisdiction bars the execution of individuals found to have mental
retardation, does the determination of a defendant's mental retardation
occur prior to the guilt/innocence stage of the trial? If not, does it occur
prior to the penalty phase of the trial?
10. If the jurisdiction does not bar execution of all individuals with mental
retardation, to what extent does the jurisdiction specifically treat mental
retardation as a mitigating circumstance in determining whether the
defendant should be sentenced to death? How clearly is that fact
communicated to the jury?
11. If the jurisdiction is one in which "future dangerousness" is a legislative
or common law standard for determining whether to impose the death
penalty, is the jury instructed explicitly that a person's mental retardation
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should not be used as a factor in finding that a defendant would be
dangerous in the future? Are prosecutors prohibited from arguing that a
person's mental retardation is a factor that the jury or judge should
consider in favor of imposing a death sentence?
12. Does the governor or other clemency authority consider an offender's
mental retardation as an important factor in favor of clemency?
13. Does the jurisdiction have policies in place to prevent discrimination
against mentally retarded defendants by police, prosecutors, defense
counsel, judges, jurors, or others in the criminal justice system?
14. Does the jurisdiction provide for training or other assistance from
organizations or individuals with expertise on mental retardation to help
the criininal justice system respond effectively to the needs of mentally
retarded defendants or offenders in the system?
15. Is sufficient training available to defense counsel to assist them in
recognizing mental retardation in their clients and understanding its
possible impact on their clients' ability to assist with their defense, on the
validity of their "confessions" (where applicable), on their eligibility for
capital punishment, and on mitigation?
16. Are sufficient funds and resources provided to defense counsel for
determining accurately the mental capacities and developmental
disabilities of a defendant who counsel believes may have mental
retardation?
17. How adequate are services of mental health experts provided by the
jurisdiction in capital cases?
a. Do prosecutors and trial judges rely upon a group of mental health
experts whose practices primarily or substantially consist of
testifying on behalf of the State?
b. Are the mental health experts well trained and well qualified for the
forensic examinations they conduct?
i. Are the mental health officials employed by the State and those
appointed by the courts otherwise engaged in the treatment of
patients?
ii. Do they have appropriate professional experience to conduct the
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examinations required in each case in which they appear?
c. Do the mental health experts spend adequate time with the subjects
of their examinations, consistent with what is required for an
adequate diagnosis under the standards that govern their profession?
d. Do courts appoint well trained and well qualified independent
mental health experts to assist defense counsel on a confidential
basis?
Mental Illness
1. What practices and policies does the jurisdiction have in place to
eliminate discrimination by police, judges, jurors, prosecutors, defense
counsel, or others in the criminal justice system against seriously
mentally ill capital defendants?
2. What policies does the jurisdiction have in place to protect a mentally ill
defendant from "waiving" his constitutional rights under circumstances
in which his mental illness could affect his ability to make a judgment
about a waiver?
3. How does the jurisdiction ensure that mentally ill defendants are not
charged with capital offenses based upon the perception that mental
illness is an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating factor?
4. Do jury instructions adequately communicate to jurors the significance of
mental illness as a mitigating factor, not as an aggravating factor, in
capital cases? Are statutorily identified mitigating factors adequately and
appropriately explained to jurors?
5. If the jurisdiction uses "future dangerousness" as a criterion for imposing
the death penalty, are jurors instructed adequately not to consider mental
illness a factor supporting such a finding?
6. Does the jurisdiction provide adequate resources to defense counsel to
identify and develop mental illness claims, as well as to assist any
defendant who is determined to be incompetent as a result of mental
illness?
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C. Recommendations for Addressing Mental Retardation and Mental
illness Issues in Death Penalty Administration
1. Jurisdictions that have not done so should bar the imposition of the death
penalty upon individuals who have mental retardation, as that term is
defined by the American Association on Mental Retardation. Whether
the definition is satisfied in a particular case should be based upon a
clinical judgment, not solely upon a legislatively prescribed IQ measure,
and judges and counsel should be trained to apply the law fully and
fairly. Testing used in arriving at this judgment need not have been
performed prior to the crime.
2. Ali actors in the criminal justice system, including police, court officers,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and prison
authorities, should be trained to recognize mental retardation or mental
illness in capital defendants and death row inmates.
3. During police investigations and interrogations, special steps should be
taken to ensure that the Miranda rights of a mentally retarded or mentally
ill person are sufficiently protected and that false, coerced, or garbled
confessions are not obtained or used.
4. The jurisdiction should have in place mechanisms to ensure that, during
court proceedings, the rights of mentally retarded or mentally ill persons
are protected against "waivers" that are the product of their limited
mental ability.
5. The determination of whether a defendant has mental retardation should
occur as early as possible in criminal proceedings, preferably prior to the
guilt/innocence phase of a trial and certainly before the penalty stage of a
trial.
6. Jurisdictions should provide sufficient resources to permit defense
counsel to assess accurately the mental capacities and developmental
disabilities of any capital defendant who counsel believes may have
mental retardation.
7. Prosecutors should employ, and trial judges should appoint, mental
health experts on the basis of their qualifications and relevant
professional experience. The paramount concern should be an expert's
ability to contribute to the appropriate resolution of the mental health
issues in the case, rather than the expert's prior status as a witness for the
State.
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8. Jurisdictions should provide adequate funding to permit the employment
of qualified mental health experts in capital cases. Experts should be paid
in an amount sufficient to attract the services of those who are well
trained and who remain current in their fields. Compensation should not
place a premium on quick and inexpensive evaluations, but rather should
be sufficient to ensure a thorough evaluation that will uncover pathology
that a superficial or cost-saving evaluation might miss.
9. Trial judges should appoint qualified mental health experts to assist the
defense confidentially according to the needs of the defense, not on the
basis of the expert's current or past status with the State.
10. Jury instructions should communicate clearly that mental illness is a
mitigating factor, not an aggravating factor, in a capital case; that jurors
should not rely upon the factor of mental illness to conclude that the
defendant or offender represents a future danger to society; and that
jurors should distinguish between the defense of insanity and the
defendant's subsequent reliance on mental illness as a mitigating factor.
11. Jurisdictions should develop and disseminate-to police, attorneys,
judges, and other court and prison officials-models of best practices on
ways to protect mentally retarded and mentally ill individuals within the
criminal justice system. In developing these models, jurisdictions should
enlist the assistance of organizations devoted to protecting the rights of
mentally retarded and mentally ill citizens.
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APPENDIX A
American Bar Association Death Penalty Moratorium Resolution*
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association calls upon each
jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment not to carry out the death penalty
until the jurisdiction implements policies and procedures that are consistent with
the following longstanding American Bar Association policies intended to (1)
ensure that death penalty cases are administered fairly and impartially, in
accordance with due process, and (2) minimize the risk that innocent persons may
be executed:
1. Implementing ABA "Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases" (adopted February 1989) and
Association policies intended to encourage competency of counsel in
capital cases (adopted February 1979, February 1988, February 1990,
August 1996);
2. Preserving, enhancing, and streamlining state and federal courts'
authority and responsibility to exercise independent judgment on the
merits of constitutional claims in state post-conviction and federal habeas
corpus proceedings (adopted August 1982, February 1990);
3. Striving to eliminate discrimination in capital sentencing on the basis of
the race of either the victim or the defendant (adopted August 1988,
August 1991); and
4. Preventing execution of mentally retarded persons (adopted February
1989) and persons who were under the age of eighteen at the time of
their offenses (adopted August 1983).
FURTHER RESOLVED, That in adopting this recommendation, apart from
existing Association policies relating to offenders who are mentally retarded or
under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of the offenses, the
Association takes no position on the death penalty.
*Approved by the American Bar Association House of Delegates, February
3, 1997.
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REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES IN SUPPORT OF THE
RESOLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Bar Association has adopted numerous policies bearing on the
manner in which the death penalty should be applied in jurisdictions where it
exists. -These policies were adopted in view of the ABA's extensive experience
with the administration of the death penalty and in light of several ABA-
sponsored studies. The policies concem: (1) competent counsel in capital cases;
(2) proper processes for adjudicating claims in capital cases (including the
availability of federal habeas corpus); (3) racial discrimination in the
administration of capital punishment; and (4) the execution of juveniles and
mentally retarded persons.
The time has now come for the ABA to take additional decisive action with
regard to capital punishment. Not only have the ABA's existing policies generally
not been implemented, but also, and more critically, the federal and state
governments have been moving in a direction contrary to these policies. The -most
recent. and most dramatic moves, both strongly opposed by the ABA, have come
in the form of laws enacted by Congress in 1996. Federal courts already are
construing one law to significantly curtail the availability of federal habeas corpus
to death row inmates, even when they have been convicted or sentenced to death
as a result of serious, prejudicial constitutional violations. Another law completely
withdraws federal funding from the Post-Conviction Defender Organizations that
have handled many post-conviction cases and that have mentored many other
lawyers who have represented death row inmates in such proceedings.
These two recently enacted laws, together with other federal and state actions
taken since the ABA adopted its policies on capital punishment, have resulted in a
situation in which fundamental due process is now systematically lacking in
capital cases. Accordingly, in order to effectuate its existing policies, the ABA
should now call upon jurisdictions with capital punishment not to carry out the
death penalty until these policies are implemented. Of course, individual lawyers
differ in their views on the death penalty in principle and on its constitutionality.
However, it should now be apparent to all of us in the profession that the
administration of the death penalty has become so seriously flawed that capital
punishment should not be implemented without adherence to the various
applicable ABA policies.
IX. BACKGROUND
The backdrop for this Recommendation is the two decades of jurisprudence
and legislation since the United States Supreme Court upheld new death penalty
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statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,12 after having invalidated earlier death penalty
statutes in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia.13 In Furman, the Court believed that then-
existing state statutes failed to properly balance the need to ensure overall
consistency in capital sentencing with the need to ensure fairness in individual
cases. Four years later, in Gregg, the Court concluded that new state statutes'
special procedural requirements for capital prosecutions provided a means by
which the states would achieve that balance.
However, two decades after Gregg, it is apparent that the efforts to forge a
fair capital punishment jurisprudence have failed.' 4 Today, administration of the
death penalty, far from being fair and consistent, is instead a haphazard maze of
unfair practices with no internal consistency. To a substantial extent, this situation
has developed because death penalty jurisdictions generally have failed to
implement the types of policies called for by existing ABA policies. The
pervasive unfairness of the capital punishment system that has evolved since
Gregg has led two of the Supreme Court justices who were part of the majority in
Gregg to regret having upheld the death penalty's constitutionality. Retired
Justice Lewis Powell, in a 1991 interview, expressed his doubt whether the death
penalty could be administered in a way that was truly fair and stated that, in
retrospect, his greatest regret was that he had voted to uphold the constitutionality
of capital punishment in McCleskey v. Kemp" and other cases.' 6 Justice Harry
Blackmun expressed similar concerns in his 1994 dissent in McFarland v. Scott:
When we execute a capital defendant in this country, we rely on the belief that
the individual was guilty, and was convicted and sentenced after a fair trial, to
justify the imposition of state-sponsored killing.... My 24 years of overseeing
the imposition of the death penalty from this Court have left me in grave doubt
whether this reliance is justified and whether the constitutional requirement of
competent legal counsel for capital defendants is being fulfilled.' 7
The already deplorable state of affairs noted by Justices Powell and
Blackmun is exacerbated by three other, very recent developments. First,
although certain states have begun to implement some ABA policies, more states
are moving in the opposite direction-undermining or eliminating important
12428 U.S. 153 (1976).
13 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REv. 355, 357
(1995) (reporting that "[v]irtually no one thinks that the constitutional regulation of capital
punishment has been a success"); see also James S. Liebman & Jonathan M. Moses, Fatal
Distortion: The Chronic Making and Unmaking of Death Penalty Law (publication
forthcoming).
15 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
16 See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451-52 (1994) (quoting
Justice Powell).
17 512 U.S. 1256, 1264 (1994).
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procedural safeguards that the ABA has found to be essential.
Second, Congress recently enacted legislation that makes it significantly
more difficult for the federal courts to adjudicate meritorious federal
constitutional claims in capital cases. Title I of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 establishes deadlines for filing federal habeas
petitions, places limits on federal evidentiary hearings into the facts underlying
federal constitutional claims, sets timetables for federal court action, limits the
availability of appellate review, establishes even more demanding restrictions on
second or successive applications for federal relief, and, in some instances,
apparently bars the federal courts from awarding relief on the basis of federal
constitutional violations where state courts have erred in concluding that no such
violation occurred.
While the ABA has consistently supported meaningful habeas corpus
reforms, this new federal legislation instead dramatically undermines the federal
courts' capacity to adjudicate federal constitutional claims in a fair and efficient
manner. Indeed, that may itself be unconstitutional, as the ABA already has
asserted in an amicus brief. Congress' adoption of the 1996 Act only underscores
the extent of this country's failure to fashion a workable and just system for
administering capital punishment.
Third, and also contrary to longstanding ABA policies, Congress has ended
funding for Post-Conviction Defender Organizations (PCDOs), which have
handled many capital post-conviction cases and have recruited and supported
volunteer lawyers in these cases for many indigent death row prisoners. The ABA
had a major role in supporting the creation of the PCDOs.
Together, these three developments have brought the adjudication of capital
cases to the point of crisis. Unless existing ABA policies are now implemented,
many more prisoners will be executed under circumstances that are inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's mandate, articulated in Furman and Gregg, that the
death penalty be fairly and justly administered.
The ABA has worked hard to foster the fair and just administration of capital
punishment. The ABA's Post-Conviction Death Penalty Representation Project
has provided expert advice and counsel to jurisdictions attempting to improve the
delivery of legal services to death row prisoners. In addition, it has recruited more
than 400 volunteer attorneys to represent indigent death row inmates. The Project
also has assisted in the creation of PCDOs and strongly opposed the successful
effort to cut off their federal funding. The ABA has testified in support of the
Racial Justice Act and actively opposed the kind of habeas corpus restrictions
enacted in 1996. And the ABA has conducted and supported a variety of training
programs for lawyers and judges in capital cases and has advocated detailed
standards for capital defense counsel. Also, various ABA groups have sponsored
numerous education programs examining the faimess of capital punishment as
implemented.
The ABA's efforts have had some impact. But recent developments have
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made the impact of incompetent counsel and the instances of uncorrected due
process violations substantially greater, and matters are likely to become worse in
the future. It is essential that the ABA now forcefully urge that executions not
occur unless each person being executed has had competent counsel and the due
process protections that the ABA has long advocated.
IH. COMPETENT COUNSEL
The ABA is especially well positioned to identify the professional legal
services that should be available to capital defendants and death row inmates. The
Association has shouldered that responsibility by conducting studies and adopting
policies dating back nearly twenty years. Seven years ago, the ABA
recommended that "competent and adequately compensated" counsel should be
provided "at all stages of capital.., litigation," including trial, direct review,
collateral proceedings in both state and federal court, and certiorari proceedings in
the U.S. Supreme Court. To implement that basic recommendation, the ABA
said that death penalty jurisdictions should establish organizations to "recruit,
select, train, monitor, support, and assist" attorneys representing capital clients.
Eight years ago, the ABA published the "Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases" and urged all jurisdictions that
employ the death penalty to adopt them. 9 Those guidelines call for the
appointment of two experienced attorneys at each stage of a capital case. 0
Appointments are to be made by a special appointing authority or committee,
charged to identify and recruit lawyers with specified professional credentials,
experience, and skills.2' The guidelines make it clear that ordinary professional
qualifications are inadequate to measure what is needed from counsel in "the
specialized practice of capital representation." To ensure that the lawyers assigned
to capital cases are able to do the work required, the guidelines state that attorneys
should receive a "reasonable rate of hourly compensation which.., reflects the
extraordinary responsibilities inherent in death penalty litigation." Concomitantly,
S Resolution of the House of Delegates, Feb. 12-13, 1990, 115 (No. 1) REP. OF THE
A.B.A., 38-39.
19 Resolution of the House of Delegates, Feb. 6-7, 1989, 114 (No. 1) REP. OF THE A.B.A.,
at 59.
20 The ABA previously had urged the federal government to adopt similar procedures and
standards for counsel appointed to represent death row prisoners in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. Resolution of the House of Delegates, Feb. 8-9, 1988, 113 (No. 1) REP. OF THE
A.B.A., at 12. Before that, the ABA had urged the U.S. Supreme Court and the Congress to
provide for competent counsel to handle certiorari proceedings and petitions for clemency
before the Court. Resolution of the House of Delegates, Feb. 12-13, 1979, 104 REP. OF THE
A.B.A., at 245.
21 In addition, the guidelines set forth the way in which counsel in a capital case should
perform various defense functions, from plea negotiations, through jury selection, the trial and
sentencing phases, and post-conviction proceedings.
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counsel should be provided with the time and funding necessary for proper
investigations, expert witnesses, and other support services.22
No state has fully embraced the system the ABA has prescribed for capital
trials. To the contrary, grossly unqualified and under compensated lawyers who
have nothing like the support necessary to mount an adequate defense are often
appointed to represent capital clients. In case after case, decisions about who will
die and who will live turn not on the nature of the offense the defendant is
charged with committing, but rather on the nature of the legal representation the
defendant receives.23
Jurisdictions that employ the death penalty have proven unwilling to establish
the kind of legal services system that is necessary to ensure that defendants
charged with capital offenses receive the defense they require. Many death
penalty states have no working public defender programs, relying instead upon
scattershot methods for selecting and supporting defense counsel in capital
cases.14 For example, some states simply assign lawyers at random from a general
list-a scheme destined to identify attorneys who lack the necessary
qualifications and, worse still, regard their assignments as a burden. Other
jurisdictions employ "contract" systems, which typically channel indigent defense
business to attorneys who offer the lowest bids.25 Other states use public defender
schemes that appear on the surface to be more promising, but prove in practice to
be just as ineffective.26
22 In August 1996, the ABA adopted a policy regarding the appropriate representation of
military defendants facing execution. To date, the military has failed to implement this policy.
23 Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt, NAT'L
L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30 (reporting the conclusions of an extensive six-state survey: capital
trials are "more like the random flip of a coin than a delicate balancing of the scales ofjustice"
because defense counsel are "ill-trained, unprepared... [and] grossly underpaid").
24 Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime,
But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1841-55 (1994).
25 Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 625, 679-81
(1986).
26 See Bright, supra note 24, at 1849-52, summarizing the current situation as follows:
The structure of indigent defense not only varies among states, it varies within many
states from county to county. Some localities employ a combination of these programs. All
of these approaches have several things in common. They evince the gross underfunding
that pervades indigent defense. They are unable to attract and keep experienced and
qualified attorneys because of lack of compensation and overwhelming workloads. Just
when lawyers reach the point when they have handled enough cases to begin avoiding
basic mistakes, they leave criminal practice and are replaced by other young,
inexperienced lawyers who are even less able to deal with the overwhelming caseloads.
Generally, no standards are employed for assignment of cases to counsel or for the
performance of counsel. And virtually no resources are provided for investigative and
expert assistance or defense counsel training.
The situation has further deteriorated in the last few years. This is largely due to the
increased complexity of cases and the increase in the number of cases resulting from
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It is scarcely surprising that the results of poor lawyering are often literally
fatal for capital defendants. Systematic studies reveal the depth of the problems
nationwide and thus supply the hard data to support reasoned policy-making.27
Case after case all too frequently reveals the inexperience of lawyers appointed to
represent capital clients. In Tyler v. Kemp 28 and Paradis v. Arave,29 state trial
courts assigned capital cases to young lawyers who had passed the bar only a few
months earlier; in Bell v. Watkins,3° a state trial court appointed a lawyer who had
never finished a criminal trial of any kind; and in Leatherwood v. State,3 yet
another trial court allowed a third-year law student to handle most of a capital
trial.
Other cases demonstrate that defense counsel in capital cases often are
incapable of handling such cases properly. In Smith v. State,32 defense counsel
asked for extra time between the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital case in
order to read the state death penalty statute for the first time. In Frey v.
Fulcomer,33 defense counsel, in purported compliance with a state statute, limited
his presentation of mitigating evidence. Unbeknownst to defense counsel, that
statute had been held unconstitutional three years earlier precisely because it
restricted counsel's ability to develop mitigating evidence. In Ross v. Kemp,34 one
defense attorney advanced a weak alibi theory, while his co-counsel mounted an
inconsistent mental incompetency defense that necessarily conceded that the
defendant had participated in the offense.35 In Romero v. Lynaugh,36 defense
expanded resources for police and prosecution and the lack of a similar increase, and
perhaps even a decline, in funding for defense programs.
Id. at 1851. (citations omitted). Moreover, at an ABA Annual Meeting program in 1995,
Scharlette Holdman described case after case of incompetent representation by counsel
appointed by judges in California and other Western states, in which compensation is typically
greater than that in most other states with capital punishment. See Scarlette Holdman in Capital
Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in this Corpus?, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 524, 581 (1996).
Thus, as the ABA has recognized, the problem is not merely underfunding. It is also the
appointment byjudges of attorneys who lack either the expertise or the experience necessary to
represent a capital defendant effectively.
27 Over the years, both the ABA and local bar and legislative groups have commissioned
such studies. In one instance, illustrative of other states' practices as well, researchers found that
Texas typically does not use central appointing authorities to choose counsel in death penalty
cases, does not monitor the performance of assigned counsel in capital cases, and does not
adequately compensate appointed counsel or reimburse them sufficiently for support services.
THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A STUDY OF REPRESENTATION IN CAPITAL CASES IN TExAs (1993).
28 755 F.2d 741 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985).
29 954 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1992).
30 692 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1982).
3 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989).
32 581 So. 2d 497 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).
13 974 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1992).
34 393 S.E.2d 244 (Ga. 1990).
3 5 See Bright, supra note 24 (listing these illustrative cases and dozens more).
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counsel declined to offer any evidence at all during the penalty phase of a capital
case, and then made the following brief and ineffective closing argument: "You
are an extremely intelligent jury. You've got that man's life in your hands. You
can take it or not. That's all I have to say."37 The jury, in its turn, sentenced the
defendant to death.
In Messer v. Kemp,38 defense counsel presented very little of the mitigating
evidence available, made no objections at all, then essentially told the jury that the
death penalty was appropriate. That defendant, too, was sentenced to die. In
Young v. Kemp,39 the defense counsel was himself so dependent on drugs during
trial that, as even he later admitted, he mounted only the semblance of a defense.
His client received the death penalty, but then chanced to see the defense lawyer
thereafter in a prison yard. The attorney had, in the interim, been convicted and
sentenced on state and federal drug charges.
Even when experienced and competent counsel are available in capital cases,
they often are unable to render adequate service for want of essential funding to
pay the costs of investigations and expert witnesses.4 ° In some rural counties in
Texas, an appointed attorney receives as little as $800 to represent a capital
defendant. 41 Similar limits are in place in other states. In Virginia, the hourly rate
for capital defense services works out to about $13.42 In an Alabama case, the
lawyer appointed to represent a capital defendant in a widely publicized case was
allowed a total of $500 to finance his work, including any investigations and
expert services needed. With that budget, it is hardly surprising that the attorney
conducted no investigation at all.43
Poorly prepared and supported trial lawyers typically do a poor job. When
they do recognize points to be explored and argued, they often fail to follow
through in a professional manner. And when they do not recognize what needs to
be done, they do nothing at all or they take actions that are inimical to the needs of
36 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989).
37 Bright, supra note 24, at 1858 (quoting Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir.
1989)).
38 831 F.2d 946 (1lth Cir. 1987).39 No. 85-98-2-MAC (M.D. Ga. 1985); see Bright, supra note 24, at 1859.
40 Spangenberg Group, supra note 27, at 159; see also Anthony Paduano & Clive A.
Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in
Capital Cases, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 281 (1991) (providing a national survey).
41 Marianne Lavelle, Strong Law Thwarts Lone Star Counsel, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990,
at 34. In one celebrated Texas case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that an appointed
attorney had received only $11.84 per hour in a capital case and, at that price, had rendered
particularly dreadful service to his indigent client. That, said the court, explained much of the
problem. "[T]he justice system got only what it paid for." Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d
1067, 1067 (5th Cir. 1992).
42 Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render
the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363,366 (1993).
Bright, supra note 24, at 1847-48; Deposition of Richard Bell at 24-25, 56-59, Grayson
v. State (Cir. Ct. Shelby County, Ala. Oct. 10, 1991). The state payment limit is now $1,000.
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their clients. The result of such inadequacies in representation is that counsel often
fail to present crucial facts. They also may fail to raise crucial legal issues,
causing their clients to forfeit their opportunity to explore those issues later, in any
court. In one recent case, appointed defense counsel scarcely did anything to
represent his client at trial and, along the way, neglected to raise three significant
constitutional claims. The federal court that reviewed the case could not consider
any of these omitted claims because, under state law, counsel's numerous defaults
barred their later consideration."
The same pattern is repeated with respect to the legal services available for
the appellate and post-conviction stages of capital cases. State appellate court
standards for adequate representation under state law are extraordinarily low.
These courts sometimes dispose of capital appeals on the basis of inadequate
briefs containing only a few pages of argument-and, in so doing, often rely on
defense counsel's "default" at trial to avoid considering constitutional claims on
the merits. 45 As for post-conviction, an ABA Task Force developed an enormous
body of eviderice in 1990 demonstrating that prisoners sentenced to death
typically receive even less effective representation in post-conviction than at the
trial stage.46 The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to
counsel in post-conviction proceedings, even in capital cases.4' Although many
states and the federal government once funded Post-Conviction Defender
Organizations, which recruited lawyers for death row inmates at the post-
conviction stage and represented others themselves, today many of those centers
have been forced to close because Congress has eliminated their federal
funding.48
The federal courts generally have not rectified this situation. The standard for
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment is so egregiously low
that the potential for relief in federal habeas corpus on such grounds is almost
always more theoretical then real. The federal courts found the "services"
rendered in the Romero, Messer, and Young cases, cited above, to be "effective"
44 Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 1994).
41 See Bright, supra note 24, at 1843 & n.55.
46 Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death
Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1,71-75 (1990).
4 Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
48 See The Special Committee on Capital Representation & The Committee on Civil
Rights, The Crisis in Capital Representation, in 51 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 169, 187-191 (Mar. 4, 1996) [hereafter cited as Crisis]. The
PCDOs were extremely effective. In 1989, Chief Judge Tjoflat of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit told the ABA Task Force that the resource centers were
"indispensable." Robbins, supra note 46, at 73. In 1994, Judge Arthur L. Alarcon of the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote that the PCDO's were "critical" to the efficient
processing of capital cases. Crisis, supra at 188-89 (citing the Appendix of the Alarcon
Memorandum to Judge Cox and Cedarbaum (Dec. 7, 1994)). Nevertheless, they were
defunded.
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for constitutional purposes-and, accordingly, all three prisoners were executed.49
Compounding the effect of incompetent representation of capital defendants
and death row inmates is improper representation of the state by prosecutors
inadequately trained in avoiding constitutional violations. In describing this
combined impact, former Pennsylvania Attorney General Ernest Preate said at an
ABA Annual Meeting program:
[I]n too many capital cases, there is ineffective assistance of counsel on both
sides .... [T]he defense counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel is not
necessarily a mistake that the defense counsel originally made, but a mistake by
the prosecutor. The prosecutor did something he or she shouldn't have done and
the defense counsel failed to object or failed to take advantage of it.50
Unfortunately, relief rarely is granted under any of the circumstances described
above.
IV. PROPER PROCESSES
The ABA consistently has sought to ensure that adequate procedures are in
place to determine whether a capital sentence has been entered in violation of
federal law. No other organization has monitored the federal habeas system more
closely, developed greater expertise regarding that system's strengths and
weaknesses, or offered more detailed prescriptions for reform.
Fourteen years ago, the ABA publicly opposed three bills then pending in
Congress that would have dramatically restricted the federal courts' ability to
adjudicate state prisoners' habeas claims. At the same time, the ABA proposed
alternatives that would have streamlined habeas litigation without undermining
the federal courts' authority and responsibility to exercise independent judgment
on the merits of constitutional claims.5
Since that time, the ABA has been deeply involved in the national debate
over federal habeas-particularly in capital cases. The ABA Task Force that
studied the situation in depth created a solid scholarly foundation for its work,
then received written and oral testimony from knowledgeable individuals and
organizations at hearings in several cities.52 In 1990, the ABA House of Delegates
adopted a set of recommendations for improving current law that were based
upon the Task Force's work.53 The recommendations included the following
49 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
50 Hon. Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Panel Discussion, The Death of Fairness? Counsel
Competency and Due Process in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1105, 1120-21
(1994) [hereinafter The Death of Fairness?].
" Resolution of the House of Delegates, Feb. 1982.
52 Robbins, supra note 46, at 58.
53 Id.; Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 115 (No. 1) REP. OF A.B.A. 38-41
(1990) (Resolution of the House of Delegates, Feb. 1990).
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principles: a death row prisoner should be entitled to a stay of execution in order
to complete one round of post-conviction litigation in state and federal court,
54
that the federal courts should consider claims that were not properly raised in state
court if the reason for the prisoner's default was counsel's ignorance or neglect,55
and that a prisoner should be permitted to file a second or successive federal
petition if it raises a new claim that undermines confidence in his or her guilt or
the appropriateness of the death sentence.56
Regrettably, none of these recommendations has been generally adopted. In
fact, the Supreme Court has denied death row prisoners the very opportunities for
raising constitutional claims that the ABA has insisted are essential. Prisoners
have not been entitled even to a single stay of execution to maintain the status quo
long enough to complete post-conviction litigation." The federal courts typically
have refused to consider claims that were not properly raised in state court, even if
the failure to raise them was due to the ignorance or neglect of defense counsel.5"
And prisoners have often not been allowed to litigate more than one petition, even
if they have offered strong evidence of egregious constitutional violations that
they could not have presented earlier.59
The consequence of these legal tangles has been that meritorious
constitutional claims often have gone without remedy. Contrary to popular belief,
most habeas petitions in death penalty cases do not rest on frivolous technicalities.
As Professor James S. Liebman has reported, in 40% of all capital cases, even in
the face of all the procedural barriers, death row inmates still have been able to
secure relief due to violations of their basic constitutional rights. 60 The percentage
securing relief would be substantially higher if the federal courts had considered
all death row inmates' claims on their merits.
Yet, in 1996, Congress enacted legislation that will make it even more
difficult for the federal courts to adjudicate federal claims in capital cases.6" This
new law, which the ABA vigorously opposed, establishes deadlines for filing
federal habeas petitions, limits on federal evidentiary hearings into the facts
underlying federal claims, timetables for federal court action, limits on the
availability of appellate review, and even more demanding restrictions on second
or successive applications from a single petitioner. The new law also contains a
provision that, according to the en banc Seventh Circuit (and contrary to the
ABA's position as amicus curiae), prevents a federal court from awarding relief
14 Id. at 40.
" Id. at 39.
56 Id. at 40.
7See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 858-59 (1994).
58 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,752-54 (1991).
59 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). Moreover, the Supreme Court has
developed numerous other door-closing doctrines that restrict death row prisoners' access to the
federal courts for habeas corpus adjudication. See The Death of Fairness?, supra note 50.
60 Memorandum of James S. Liebman, Panel Discussion, Nov. 22, 1995.
61 Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
2002]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
on the basis of a claim that the federal court finds to be meritorious if it concludes
that the state court that rejected the claim was not "unreasonably" wrong in doing
so.
62
V. RACE DISCRIMINATION
In 1988, the ABA adopted a policy of striving to eliminate "discrimination in
capital sentencing on the basis of the race of either the victim or the defendant.,
63
Nevertheless, longstanding patterns of racial discrimination remain in courts
across the country.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that defendants are more likely to be
sentenced to death if their victims were white rather than black.6" Other studies
have shown that in some jurisdictions African Americans tend to receive the
death penalty more often than do white defendants.65 And in countless cases, the
poor legal services that capital clients receive are rendered worse still by racist
attitudes of defense counsel.66
62 Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996). For a summary and analysis of the
various new habeas corpus provisions, see Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas
Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996).
63 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 113 (No. 2) REP. OF A.B.A. 14 (1988)
(Resolution of the House of Delegates, Aug. 1988). In addition, the ABA has urged Congress to
"prevent or minimize any disproportionate effects of general federal death penalty legislation on
Native Americans subject to federal jurisdiction." Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates,
116 (No.2) REPORTS OF A.B.A. 51 (1991) (Resolution of the House of Delegates, Aug. 1991).64 See Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing
Act Be Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?, 18
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 777, 780-83 (1990-91) (summarizing various studies) (this
law review article is an adaptation of the ABA's testimony in support of the proposed Racial
Justice Act before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Judiciary); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES A PATrERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. S6889-90
(daily ed., May 24, 1990); Laurie Ekstrand and Harriet C. Ganson, Panel Discussion, The
Death Penalty in the Twenty-First Century, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 320-23, 341, 345, 347,
348 (1995); see also SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989). In Kentucky, approximately 1,000
African Americans have been murdered over the past twenty years. Yet none of the prisoners
on that state's death row is there for having killed a black victim. Letter from the Death Penalty
Information Center, Apr. 2, 1996.
61 See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 399 (1990).
66 Sadly, defense attorneys who shrink from rocking the boat locally still may fail, even in
this day and age, to object to jury selection procedures that exclude African Americans from
service. See Bright, supra note 24, at 1857 (citing Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1497-1500
(11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 (1989) (denying relief in such an instance)). Cases in
which defense attorneys use racial slurs in reference to their clients are also all too common. See
Bright, supra note 24, at 1865 (citing Transcript of Opening and Closing Arguments at 39, State
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Justice Blackmun lamented the Court's failure to fashion an effective means
of preventing the "biases and prejudices that infect society generally" from
influencing "the determination of who is sentenced to death. 67 After years of
watching race play so large a role in the administration of capital punishment, he
concluded, in part for that reason, that he no longer could find any execution
consistent with the Constitution. The ABA need not go so far in order to resolve,
as a matter of ABA policy, that executions should cease until effective
mechanisms are developed for eliminating the corrosive effects of racial prejudice
in capital cases.
The Supreme Court, in rejecting a constitutional challenge to the systemic
pattern of racial discrimination in capital sentencing, invited legislative action to
deal with this situation.68 Thereafter, the ABA, in conformance with a resolution
adopted by the House of Delegates in August 1988, supported enactment of the
Racial Justice Act, a measure designed to create a remedy for such racial
discrimination. 69 Although the House of Representatives twice has approved the
Racial Justice Act, the full Congress has not enacted it. Accordingly, these
patterns of racial discrimination remain unrectified. Ironically, Justice Powell, the
author of the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision rejecting the constitutional challenge
discussed above, has now indicated that he regrets his participation in that
decision (as well as in other decisions upholding the death penalty) more than
anything else during his tenure on the court.7°
VI. EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED INDIVIDUALS AND JUVENILES
The ABA has established policies against the execution of both persons with
"mental retardation," as defined by the American Association of Mental
Retardation, 71 and persons who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their
offenses.7 2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of
executions in both of those instances.73 While many states now bar executions of
v. Dungee, Record Excerpts at 102, (11 th Cir.) (No. 85-8202), decided sub nom. Isaacs v.
Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986)), showing the
following opening argument: "You have got a little ole nigger man over there that doesn't
weigh over 135 pounds. He is poor and he is broke. He's got an appointed lawyer.... He is
ignorant. I will venture to say he has an IQ of not over eighty." Id. Unsurprisingly, the jury that
heard that statement from defense counsel later sentenced the defendant to death.
67 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1153 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,319 (1987).
69 See Tabak, supra note 64, at 777.
'o See JEFFRIES, supra note 16, at 451-52.
71 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 114 (No. I) REP. OF A.B.A. 48 (1989)
(Resolution of the House of Delegates, Feb. 1989).
72 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108 REPORTS OF A.B.A. 814 (1983).
73 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (refusing to hold that the execution of a
mentally retarded prisoner violated the Eighth Amendment); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
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the retarded, other states continue to execute both retarded individuals and, on
occasion, offenders who were under eighteen at the time they committed the
offenses for which they were executed.74
VII. CONCLUSION
As former American Bar Association President John J. Curtin, Jr. told a
congressional committee in 1991, "Whatever you think about the death penalty, a
system that will take life must first give justice. 75 This recommendation would
not commit the ABA to a policy regarding the morality or the advisability of
capital punishment per se. Rather, this recommendation would reinforce
longstanding Association policies that seek to bring greater fairness to the
administration of the death penalty. Those policies rest firmly on the special
competence and experience that only members of the legal profession can bring
to bear.
For many years, the ABA has conducted studies, held educational programs,
and produced studies and law review articles 76 about the administration of the
death penalty. As a result of that work, the Association has identified numerous,
critical flaws in current practices. Those flaws have not been redressed; indeed,
they have become more severe in recent years, and the new federal habeas law
and the defunding of the PCDOs have compounded these problems. This
situation requires the specific conclusion of the ABA that executions cease, unless
and until greater fairness and due process prevail in death penalty
implementation.
361, 380 (1989) (refusing to hold that the execution of prisoners who were sixteen and
seventeen years of age at the time of their offenses violated the Eighth Amendment).74 EMILY FABRYCKI REED, THE PENRY PENALTY: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND OFFENDERS
wr'H MENTAL RETARDATION 39 (1993) (reporting that mentally retarded prisoners account for
12% to 20% of the population on death row); RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICA 95 (1991) (reporting that near the end of 1990 there were thirty-two death row
prisoners who had been under eighteen years of age at the time of their offenses); Victor Streib,
Report (Sept. 19, 1995) (reporting forty-two such prisoners only five years later). Since 1973,
140 death sentences have been imposed on juvenile offenders. Letter from the Death Penalty
Information Center, Apr. 2, 1996.75 Habeas Corpus Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 447 (1992), microformed on CIS No.
H521-33 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
76 See, e.g., Panel Discussion, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in This
Corpus?, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 524 (1996); The Death of Fairness?, supra note 49; Panel
Discussion, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive
the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239 (1994).
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